Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.
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His explanation of this link illustrates the central significance of rational agency in his larger epistemic picture. A common objection to even limited infallibility claims is the idea, often attributed to Wittgenstein, that where one cannot be wrong, one cannot be right either.
But Schwitzgebel has also suggested that our attitudes about introspection may be particularly obstinate. According to these accounts, our awareness of our mental states is sometimes peculiarly directin both an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. To knolwedge this point, Burge uses the following gerlter transcendental reasoning. Reed argues that empirical investigation is sometimes required to determine what one believes on a certain issue: The first is exegetical: Including helpful chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Self Knowledge is essential reading for those interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and personal identity.
Agentialists maintain that our rational agency guarantees that we are capable of—or even that we possess—self-knowledge. Expression and Self-KnowledgeOxford: Limiting acquaintance accounts to self-knowledge knnowledge phenomenal states—or, more strictly, self-knowledge of mental states individuated by phenomenology—does not entirely fix their scope, as philosophers disagree as to which kinds of mental states are individuated by phenomenology.
Brie Gertler, Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism – PhilArchive
Science Logic and Mathematics. Self-consciousness, if the word is ggertler be used at all, must not be described on the hallowed paraoptical sefl, as a torch that illuminates itself by beams of its own light reflected from a mirror in its own insides. No trivia or quizzes yet. Aquinas marked it as to-read Mar 16, Pain … is not picked out by one of its accidental properties; rather it is picked out by the property of being pain itself, by its immediate phenomenological quality.
Including helpful chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Self Knowledge is essential reading for those interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and personal identity. Gertker answer this objection, acquaintance theorists will concede that we can be wrong about our own phenomenal states.
Brie Gertler, Self-Knowledge – PhilPapers
Shoemaker presents three main arguments to show that self-blindness is impossible in a rational creature. Awareness of the self Descartes endorsed a limited infallibility thesis of this sort. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: Beliefs qualify as knowledge by virtue of some feature not directly accessible to the thinking subject, such as the fact that they appropriately nrie from the exercise of a reliable inner sense or mindreading mechanism.
But his view is not merely that, as geertler responsible for our attitudes, we must be capable of coming to know them Moran would add: Like Byrne, Gallois maintains that reasoning according to the doxastic schema generates self-knowledge.
Kind contends that these arguments do not directly threaten inner sense accounts. The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology.
Sf Kuan marked it as to-read Apr 03, But how does this process ensure that the output the representation of the scanned mental state matches the input the scanned state itself? Kathleen marked it as to-read Dec 20, Contemporary philosophers generally deny that we are infallible or omniscient about our mental states.
Grasped in Thought rated it really liked it Jun 24, Byrne argues that reasoning in accord with the doxastic schema is in a certain sense self-verifying. How do you know your own thoughts and feelings? Wilson now acknowledges this limitation.
On the relevant interpretation of this case, the pledge mistakes coldness for pain: A pain or itch that is known by acquaintance is grasped through accessible evidence: The monitoring mechanism involved in inner sense must form representations of the mental states it takes as input.
References found in this work BETA.
Denis marked it as to-read Aug 15, Brie Gertler is a philosopher who works primarily on problems in the philosophy of the mind. This book is not sdlf featured on Listopia. She is not committed to a particular account of how avowals constitute knowledge, but she presents a number of approaches compatible with her neo-expressivism.
The idea that we know our mental states through acquaintance with them is usually associated with Russellbut such accounts trace their lineage at least to Descartes.
Burge does not describe how we arrive at judgments about our attitudes to which we are entitled. Coliva argues that self-ascriptions of commitments—which for her include not only beliefs and intentions broe also rationally held conative attitudes, such as desires—will always be true provided that the thinker in question is rational and has the relevant conceptsbecause these self-ascriptions will create the attitudes ascribed.
One version of this denial charges that by focusing on our access to our mental states, standard accounts of self-knowledge portray the thinker engaged in self-reflection as passive, a mere spectator or detector of a cognitive show.